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Greater trade integration has often been viewed as requiring greater standardization in 
institutions, without which the benefits of trade do not materialize. There are many 
current debates concerning the degree and area of standardization needed and these 
debates are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This paper, drawing on both the 
fiscal federalism and the trade literature, argues that increasing trade integration is 
consistent with a wide array of institutional choices.  The final outcome, in terms of 
which institutions have prevailed, has depended substantially on political pressures for 
standardization and not necessarily on a clear assessment of economic gains. 
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                 As international economic integration has deepened, countries have been 
increasingly concerned about whether globalization is diminishing their ability to hold to 
the policies and institutions that they consider important to enhancing domestic welfare. 
The concern is that globalization reduces the set of choices a country can make in terms 
of domestic institutions by “forcing” standardization and by so doing diminishes a 
country’s chances of raising growth and protecting the poor.  Countries and firms 
choosing institutional diversity are seen to be turning their backs on the gains to be 
garnered from global economic integration.  In theory, arguments could be found to 
support either hypothesis: that more standardization or increased diversity in institutional 
design should surface with greater economic integration.  This paper contends that the 
empirical evidence indicates that it is possible to maintain substantial institutional 
diversity while simultaneously benefiting from increased economic integration. 
This paper does not aim to focus on the myriad economic forces influencing 
institutional design but instead asks whether the sum total of these forces always leads to 
(or should lead to) greater standardization in institutions across countries.  This paper 
does not aim to prove that countries are more or less integrated (or globalized) than they 
were 10-20 or 500 years ago, or that institutions have not changed or will not change as 
globalization proceeds further, but simply that a large degree of integration is consistent 
with countries choosing different institutional paths.  It supports this argument by 
presenting evidence from countries or regions that have seen large increases in trade.  A 
stronger test would be to create an index of “institutional diversity” and to see how this 
index affects overall trade. However, currently there is no such index and I resort to 
analyzing the experience of a number of countries that have seen increasingly greater   3
integration with other countries in order to support the hypotheses discussed in the 
paper.
2 
In this paper, I draw on the public finance/fiscal federalism literature to shed light 
on the positive and normative aspects of the relationship between economic integration 
and institutional standardization/harmonization.  In one sense, economic integration 
among different states within a nation or of different countries in a global economy can 
be viewed as a set of points along a continuous line representing larger and larger 
entities—with one glaring difference at the political economy level.  Nation states are 
overseen by an entity that (ideally) promotes the overall growth and poverty reduction 
goals within a country and that will take the redistributive measures necessary to achieve 
these goals, while the international economy does not have such a sovereign entity.  In 
terms of the influence exerted, the international setting is dominated by wealthier or 
larger countries and large multinational firms (at the country level the analogy being 
large firms or wealthy landowners).  Imbalances in the influence exerted by different 
countries and the absence of a sovereign power make choosing any international rule 
difficult, and may be expected to bias the outcome of such a rule to a greater extent in 
favor of the economically powerful.  
Alesina and others (1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2002), Feldstein (1997), Casella and 
Feinstein (1990), and Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1997) among others have differentiated 
between the economic and the political desire to unify or harmonize countries’ policies 
and institutions in the context of multiple sovereign nations trading together.  Much of 
this work has focused on the particularities of the progressively tighter links between the 
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members of the European Union (EU).  In fact, these authors contend that much of the 
pressure for harmonization comes from the desire to have a tighter political union. 
Feldstein (1997) for example has argued that the economic rationale for a common 
currency in Europe did not exist.  Rather, Europe’s desire to integrate closer through the 
adoption of a common currency has had a primarily political basis. 
Sachs and Sala-i-Martin compare fiscal federalism in Europe with the approach of  
the United States (US) using the notion of optimum currency areas.  They view the US as 
a set of regions tied by “irrevocably fixed exchange rates” and argue that this system is 
reasonably efficient because the federal system absorbs a substantial fraction of 
interregional shocks (there is therefore no need for nominal exchange rate alignments). 
They discuss the need for greater insurance/better compensation mechanisms in unions 
where there is greater centralization, more centralization implying greater standardization 
of objectives or means or both.  
As Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001) point out, centralization can generate 
substantial benefits if there is a high degree of economic interdependence to begin with 
while heterogeneity or diversity in endowments or preferences calls for diversity in 
policies and institutions.  The former tendency or centralization of rule-making (which 
often results in standardization) is limited by information and political constraints just as 
diversity of institutions may also be limited by political constraints. (Oates, 1999). 
Alesina and Waciarg (1999) argue, however, that the lower the barriers to trade (or the 
greater the degree of economic integration), the lower the need for “political” integration 
since countries can benefit from being small and heterogeneous if trade barriers are small 
(as long as these sources of heterogeneity are not in themselves barriers to trade). Note   5
however that it is in practice difficult to distinguish between regulations/rules that affect 
purely domestic or non-trade activities and those which constitute barriers to trade. 
Casella and Feinstein (1990) develop a model in which an initial expansion in 
trade is accompanied by the integration of political units in order to support trading 
activity.  Over time increased profitability of trade in larger markets leads to reduced 
transactions costs and a desire for political diversity.  This is accompanied by less 
harmonization.  Therefore, depending on the relative returns to diversity (which are 
increased with heterogenous preferences and endowments) and standardization (lower 
transactions costs), the outcomes will differ over time and for different groups of 
countries. 
Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2002) contend that too strong a pressure for 
centralization in policies and regulations (standardization) can increase pressures for 
opting out of any intergovernmental union, particularly when there is a large degree of 
heterogeneity among the members.  They argue that the benefits of harmonization 
/standardization depend on the policy area considered.  In terms of the legislation 
required to ensure a “common” market, they conclude that “a certain degree of 
approximation of domestic laws is necessary to guarantee a level playing field.  On the 
other hand excessive harmonization may at times become an infringement rather than a 
support of  free area-wide competition.”  Others (Dur and Roelfsema, 2002) demonstrate 
that centralization of decision making may fail to internalize policy externalities and may 
lead to either over/under provision of public goods.   
Baldwin (1970) argues that the world will be divided between rich countries 
linked together by mutual recognition agreements and less developed countries that face   6
hegemonic harmonization (rules set by rich countries).  He concludes that in reality 
harmonization is a practical goal only for countries that are not “too” different. 
Eisenmann and Verdier (2002) distinguish between different types of regulation/ 
rule setting: (1) unilateral, (2) negotiated reciprocity where countries agree to set their 
standards in a mutually beneficial way, with harmonization as a special case, and (3) 
mutual recognition defined as agreeing  on ultimate objectives but leaving the definition 
of the means at the discretion of the country.  In this case countries trust each others’ 
certification processes.  Alesina, Angeloni and Schunecht (2002) provide a good 
summary of how the EU treats legislation/standards within member countries and a 
discussion of the types of policy areas that might benefit from centralization 
/standardization and those that might benefit from diversity and customization in terms of 
both objectives and means (of implementation).  As is clear from a reading of their paper 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to find areas where à priori countries will always favor 
standardization or always favor diversity. 
  Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) theoretical work is closely related to the hypothesis 
and findings of this paper.  In their work, barriers that affect trade work together to 
determine the actual access to a market.  Thus regulations/standards and tariffs work 
together, an increase in one in a given country can be offset by a decline in another.  Thus 
one of their main messages is that if governments were granted more sovereignty over 
their policy choices (but asked to maintain a given level of market access), GATT’s rules 
would deliver globally efficient outcomes.  
This paper is also related to the international trade literature, which views 
standard setting as a strategic exercise as in Brander and Spencer (1985), Fischer and   7
Serra (2000), Barrett (1994), and Kennedy (1994).  In these models standards/regulations 
are designed with a view to limiting entry and keeping competitors out of the market 
rather than with a view to lowering transactions costs. 
Finally, this paper is related to the extensive literature on institutions and trade, 
such as the works by Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990), Greif(1977a, 1977b), Perotti 
and Modigliani (1990), World Bank (2001), and Islam (2002), which discuss the 
relationship between various institutional designs and trade. 
In terms of what the evidence shows regarding institutional structure in today’s  
globalized world, I would like to make four points.  First, globalization seems to be quite 
consistent with diversity.  The distribution of the sources of diversity, i.e., new 
innovations in institutional design (either countries or regions) can be expected to  change 
with changing economic realities.  Second, the empirical evidence indicates that 
particular institutional differences (diversity) may or may not consistently affect overall 
resource flows in the directions expected because of countervailing factors.  Third, it is 
more important to think about the overall institutional composition of a country than 
about the role of particular institutions in influencing resource flows across borders and 
in influencing economic outcomes.  Fourth, a growing number of sovereign and non-
sovereign bodies are at work establishing  international institutions that attempt to 
produce conformity in processes/product standards/regulations.  The effect of any 
institution on efficiency and distribution depends broadly speaking on where it is set 
relative to where countries are initially, for example, in their initial income and literacy 
levels. Also, countries at different income per capita levels, with heterogeneous 
preferences and endowments, may have dissimilar objectives.  Thus it follows that if   8
benefits/costs are to be more “fairly” spread, then all countries need to collaborate on the 
“level” of any new rule or standard and on the phasing of such change over time. And it 
follows that the case for additional international regulations/standards need to be 
carefully scrutinized. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss some definitions and 
the reasons why greater economic integration may influence institutional design.  I follow 
this discussion with some empirical evidence linking trade and institutional structure in 
countries, and a consideration of international institutions.  The final section concludes. 
 
Some Definitions and Why Trade Affects Institutions 
Before proceeding further, the first order of business is to clarify what is meant by 
institutions.  In the economics literature it is defined as the informal and formal rules 
(including regulations, laws, norms/customs) that influence behavior. Institutions may be 
differentiated from policies, though in practice the distinction is sometimes blurred. 
Policies may be thought of as the goals that governments or others want to attain (such as 
100% rural electrification or a stable exchange rate, or a certain rate of inflation), and the 
institutions as the rules governing the actions of individuals such that these outcomes  are 
realized (World Bank, 2001).  These rules could be those within an organization for 
example, or those governing how different entities/organizations interact with each other. 
In common parlance (though not in this text), the word institution is used to denote an 
organization as well, examples being the judiciary, the government, and private 
companies.  In this text, as in economic theory, I distinguish between the rules and 
processes that govern actions and the actors (e.g. organizations) that undertake the   9
actions-only the former being “institutions”.  So, the institutional structure of the 
judiciary, or of government or of  private companies, in this text, would mean the 
procedures, laws, regulations or norms, internal or external to the organization/group that 
determine how individuals within the judiciary, within government, or within private 
companies, behave.  Following economic theory, institutions affect economic outcomes 
by influencing both the incentives and the opportunity sets of individuals/ entities. 
Second, it is necessary to state what I am referring to as globalization. 
Globalization is increased trade in goods and services, movement of labor and capital 
across borders, information exchange and the internationalization of ideas, and physical 
changes in one country resulting from increased trade in goods and services.  Changes in 
technology and enhanced economic integration has induced structural changes in 
economic markets as evidenced by the number and nature of the players dealing across 
borders- such as large multinational  companies, and multinational NGOs, the WTO, the 
large integrated community called the EU and the 200 or more Free Trade Agreements 
that have been signed and that formally bind countries to act according to some common 
rules.  As a result, the proliferation and design of institutions which guide commerce are 
heavily affected by both sovereign and non-sovereign actors working within and outside 
domestic borders—making for very complex structures and a complex process of 
institutional change.  Sometimes globalization refers to these structural changes (e.g. the 
proliferation of multinationals or the fragmentation of the production process) as well, 
though not in this text. 
It is useful at this point to ask how greater economic integration affects 
institutional design.  Opening borders for economic exchange subjects countries to   10
greater competition from an increased flow of goods and services or from new goods and 
services, and opportunities are presented through access to larger markets and the 
realization of potential economies of scale and scope. Prospective returns to trade in 
goods and services also change as a result of greater information/technology flows across 
borders.  Countries borrow and adopt good ideas and countries find new designs 
/processes (technology) in order to compete better on world or domestic markets.  Over 
time flows across borders also change individual tastes.  Changes in regulations/ 
standards therefore  generally arise for one or more of the following reasons:  
•  Reduce transactions costs associated with trade (i.e. to facilitate trade)  
•  Increase the ability to compete better in markets vis a vis others and to 
take advantage of new knowledge (even in non-traded sectors) to raise 
productivity 
•  Prevent entry/ restrict competition in markets 
•  Reduce spillovers once borders are opened (e.g. finance) 
In short, changes in relative prices (including wages) set in motion by economic 
integration affect net returns and the distribution of returns associated with pursuing a 
given set of policies and relying on a given set of institutions.  All these forces work on 
institutional structure and within each country, may either lead to greater differentiation 
in institutional design or to greater similarities (the extreme form being standardization) 
as institutions are changed to improve performance (World Bank, 2001, Islam, 2001, 
2003).   
History provides some interesting insights into the impact of competition.  In the 
13
th and 14
th centuries for example, much of Europe could be characterized as city-states   11
that traded intensively with each other.  Merchants and states endeavored much as they 
do today to increase their share in gains from trade.  As Pistor et al (2000) show, 
competition among neighboring countries such as England and France led to the adoption 
/adaptation of company laws within countries as firms in each country worked with their 
governments to promote a more efficient business environment.  In Europe, during the 
19
th century businesses operated under a concession system in which rulers granted 
entrepreneurs the right to incorporate on a case-by-case basis, often as a special favor.  In 
the latter part of the century, England instituted a system of company registration such 
that the right to incorporate was granted automatically on meeting certain minimum  
requirements predetermined by the state.  In this way, the government took an arms 
length approach to market transactions that allowed for more competition and set in place 
a process whose outcome depended more on the merits of the case than on personal 
connections.  In France, the shift was induced by the competition French businesses faced 
from English companies on the continent (Pistor and others, 2000).  However, in the 
actual design the corporate laws differ. 
In the latter part of the 19
th century, as transport costs declined, and international 
trade expanded, Thailand experienced a rice export boom.  Prior to this period, 
Thailand’s land markets were relatively underdeveloped and one could classify the 
country as relatively land-abundant and labor scarce.  Changing relative prices and large 
new export markets increased the demand for land, and, most interestingly, for formal 
institutions governing rights to land- previously these had been mostly determined by 
traditional practice.  New institutions were demanded to reduce the transactions costs 
with acquiring land in the more profitable environment.  Beginning in 1892 and   12
continuing for several decades thereafter, the government responded to the need for 
formal land market institutions by implementing a series of procedural and administrative 
changes (Siamwalla and others, 1993 , World Bank, 2001). 
Soesastro (1998) writes how with increasing globalization, there has been strong 
competition among countries in the East Asia region as they have vied with each other to 
make their policies and institutions more attractive to investors.  More recently, others 
have shown that international competition has affected local institutions but has not 
necessarily led to a uniform design of laws nor to a race to the bottom (Rodrik 1997, 
Freeman 1994a), as some had feared.  
Examples abound showing how good innovations/ideas in one country have led to 
adaptations of these new ideas in other countries (trading of information).  In other words 
the “demonstration effect” has teeth.  The Grameen Bank, a micro-credit organization in 
Bangladesh was an institutional innovation designed to provide credit to poor landless 
women.  Grameen practices group lending ensuring collective responsibility for loan 
repayment and it has an active social/ community development plan.  This  Bangladeshi 
initiative has ignited interest all over the world with countries from Latin America and 
Africa attempting to establish their own microcredit organizations.  
Diversity in Institutions 
The above examples demonstrate some of the ways in which globalization may 
affect institutional design and provide an impetus for change—namely through the forces 
of competition, the opportunity for profit and for learning.  What about the tension 
between the move towards standardization and the need for customization/innovation?  
Grameen’s example already provides the first data point, and the corporate laws of   13
England and France (discussed earlier) the second.  In the Grameen case, a 
“standardized” Grameen structure was not put in place around the world.  Instead, each 
country has adapted (or innovated) around the original Grameen Bank design.  For 
example, Bolivia’s BancoSol has replicated Grameen’s group lending model but does not 
focus on social services; it also lends to individuals and reaches the relatively richer 
income groups (Murdoch, 1976).  Grameen’s founder helped set up the Good Faith Fund 
in Arkansas- a program which lends to poor women and also a la Grameen, implements a 
set of complementary plans targeted to development of the community including the 
provision of technical assistance for female entrepreneurs.
3 
 The European Union (EU) provides a striking example demonstrating the truth of 
the propositions mentioned earlier in this paper that diversity and trade can coexist, that 
no single institution determines a country’s competitiveness (or resource flows across 
borders) that overall institutional quality matters and that more global standards/ 
regulation face difficult efficiency and distributional issues, particularly with 
heterogeneous preferences and endowments.  Since the conception and establishment of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, there have been a number of 
institutional changes within the community with several attempts at, and continued 
commitment to harmonization fostered by the belief that such harmonization was critical 
to closer integration.  Economic integration has progressed, but income, social and 
political factors have differed enough among the countries such that varied institutional 
solutions to similar issues have evolved and been maintained.  The EU countries use a 
differentiated range of binding and non-binding legal instruments in order to maintain 
their institutional diversity while enhancing economic and political integration.  In some 
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areas, they actively harmonize regulations; in others they have directives, that they agree 
to share common objectives but are free to approach the issue concerned in their own 
specific ways.  In still other areas, they follow a policy of mutual recognition, in which 
each country recognizes the other’s legislation/regulation/standard.  In other words, there 
is quite a bit of room in many policy areas for differentiation among countries in terms of 
both detailed/specific objectives and means. 
According to the accepted theory of public regulation and public service delivery 
in federal systems (alternative referred to as the “subsidiarity” issue in the EU), it is better 
or more effective to regulate activities having primarily local consequences (and few 
cross border spillovers) at the local level.  When regulation is delegated to the local level, 
there is some expectation that there will be differences between localities and it is 
obvious how institutional diversity may arise.  What is often overlooked is that the case 
for diversity is strong even in areas where it makes sense to regulate at a national or 
higher (than local) level of government.  As long as the desired policy objectives are 
attained, there is nothing that says that there needs to be institutional standardization 
within the jurisdiction of the government. 
While most of the EU countries have chosen to be united by a common currency 
and to share free borders, the countries in the EU differ in many ways.  First, they even 
vary in terms of the types of companies they recognize.  More specifically, company laws 
define different categories of ownership.  In the United Kingdom’s (UK) law, three main 
types of company are recognized (namely, companies limited by shares, companies 
limited by guarantee and unlimited companies), under Dutch company law two types are 
recognized (company limited by shares and a private company with limited liability).   15
French company law recognizes two main types of companies – commercial and civil. 
Commercial companies are of three types: unlimited liability companies, those where the 
liability of the shareholders is limited to their contribution to the capital of the company 
and those which comprise mixed shareholders- that is those who are personally liable and 
those shareholders whose liability is limited.  A civil company may not engage in any 
commercial activity.  
A simple comparison of the some of the corporate laws in different EU countries 
reveal differences in tax regulations.  The corporate tax rate is 25% in Germany (though 
some types of companies have a special status), in the United Kingdom (UK) there is a 
two-tier tax rate with corporations whose profits are less than GBP 1.5 million paying  
19% and the others 30%.  The corporate tax rate is around 35% in the Netherlands 
(Richard, ed., (1992- 2004)). 
The procedures required to start a business also vary.  In France, minimum capital 
requirements amount to 7,500 Euros for a private limited liability company.  In Germany, 
the minimum capital requirement for the same is 25,000 Euros and in the UK there is no 
minimum capital requirement.  To register and clear the proposed name of the company  
requires eight days and 38 Euros in France, and in Germany it requires one day and there 
is no fee.  To register new firms, there are altogether 10 distinct procedural/legal 
requirements in France, requiring over 53 days to complete at a total cost of 704 Euros.  
In the UK, the comparable numbers (at time of writing) are 6, 18 and $US 264, and for 
Germany, 9 steps, 45 days and  1,425 euros.
4  
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Despite a high degree of potential labor mobility, regulations covering the 
conditions of employment are not uniform.  For example, the maximum duration of fixed 
term contracts in Germany is 96 months, in Spain it is 36 months while in the UK and in 
Belgium there is no maximum duration.  There is no mandatory minimum wage in 
Germany or Italy, but there is one in both the UK and in Belgium.  The rules governing 
severance pay also fluctuate among the countries of the EU.  In Portugal, 20 months of 
full wages are payable as severance pay after covered employment of twenty years.  The 
corresponding number of months for Belgium, Spain, Germany and the UK are 0, 12, 0 
and 7.5.
5 In the UK and Belgium, it is not considered unfair to terminate the employment 
contract without cause. In both Italy and Germany, it is. 
Notwithstanding borders that are unrestricted in terms of capital flows, banking 
regulations and capital market institutions vary significantly within the EU. Several 
research papers have been written analyzing bank-based versus market- based banking 
systems and the impacts of particular institutional structures on growth and development 
yet none have indicated that one or the other system will penalize economic outcomes in 
open economies.  Recent research indicates that there is no particular institutional design 
that is critical to capital accumulation and growth but rather what is important is the 
overall level of development of the financial sector and legal system and the efficiency 
with which it allocates financial resources (Beck and Levine, 2002). 
With respect to financial reporting, the EU member states have significant 
differences in national practices, yet follow a mutual recognition policy.  They have 
acknowledged that financial statements from the other states must be accepted in all other 
member states without any need for restatement or reconciliation (Hegarty, 1997).  This 
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has been accompanied by some liberalization of accounting services.  As Hegarty 
explains, under the agreement reached by the EU countries, a French company listed on 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange can file its accounts according to French standards and is 
not under an obligation to indicate how the statements would be different if done under 
German standards- showing a conscious acceptance of differences in regulatory design. 
A recent debate in the EU about tax policy demonstrates how, in the absence of a 
clear economic rationale for continuous harmonization, decisions eventually become very 
politicized.  EU finance ministers are interested in harmonizing the base on which 
company taxes are calculated.  However opinion is divided on this issue.  Countries such 
as Britain and Ireland and some of the newer members from Eastern Europe are 
reportedly not interested in tax base harmonization while France and Germany are.  The 
former group believe in the value of tax competition and institutional diversity while the 
latter believe in stopping “unfair” competition.
6  Another debate demonstrates how 
different economic and social values, that could easily remain “different” come under 
attack once the harmonization bandwagon has taken off.  An EU directive limits the 
number of hours an employee can work to 48 in a week.  The UK has managed to opt-out 
of this directive but it seems that a strengthening of the directive could deprive the UK of 
this right.
7  Time and political bargaining will tell which side wins out. 
The laws (and regulations ) of different countries in a given area may vary both in 
the substance and also in the degree to which there are detailed prescriptions or 
guidelines.  Furthermore, there may be one or several laws/regulations that determine the 
conduct of any entity in a single transaction type.  For example, in Spain the legal sources 
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covering both the substantive and procedural aspects of  company bankruptcy are spread 
among five different laws - The Commercial Codes 1829 and 1885, The Civil Procedural 
Rules, The Civil Code 1889, and the Suspension of Payments Act 1922 (Philippe & 
Partners and Deloitte & Touche, (2002)).  In every EU state there exist legal procedures 
that allow for the reorganization or rehabilitation of businesses encountering difficulties. 
However reorganization procedures vary a great deal with respect to how they are 
administered and what effects they have on various stakeholders.  To add to this, any 
student of law or legal systems would readily point out that in all countries there is also a 
multitude of informal practices or “customs” that complement these laws/regulations and 
affect how these formal rules play out in practice. 
As acknowledged by the EU itself, attempts at harmonization are motivated by 
both economic and political considerations.  Furthermore, the EU, in its attempts to 
represent itself as a single entity has established EU-wide organizations with authority 
over its members.  Experience shows that once an organization is established it takes on a 
life of its own; these organizations are busy designing various kinds of legislation that 
would have EU-wide implications.  It would be a difficult thing to argue that the net 
increase in intra-EU trade from increased harmonization’s would be so much higher as to 
justify the costs of additional standardization in the details of all legislation.  This is so 
particularly so because some standardization of objectives could be had without 
standardizing institutional design.  But even the need for standardization of objectives is 
arguable.  While proponents of free trade would argue that all trade related barriers 
should be reduced for economic efficiency, it seems from recent debates at the WTO and   19
within the EU that it is not a simple matter to decide what is trade related (as Bagwell’s 
article on overall market access shows) and what is not.   
Lessons for international economic integration can be drawn from the 
consolidation of states over time within what are sovereign nations today.  Within 
countries, where mobility of factors, goods and services are high, and where income per 
capita differences (and other initial conditions) may be expected to vary less than across 
countries, one might expect not to see much institutional diversity.  However, the 
evidence indicates otherwise.  The United States in the 18
th and 19
th centuries, Australia, 
Canada, Brazil, and India are examples of large countries that have had to deal with 
integration among provinces/states that differed in their social, political, and economic 
conditions.  Integration has not been easy as the American civil war bore witness.  Even 
after the United States became one country with a central government, barriers to trade 
between the states existed.  Now, though an integrated economy, several institutional and 
policy variations have been maintained at the state level.  Looking at the labor market for 
example, the minimum wage in Ohio is 2.65 dollars an hour as opposed to 5.15 in Idaho 
(Table 1).  The unemployment benefit varies from state to state.  The corporate tax rate is 
10% in Pennsylvania and 7.5% in New York (Table 2).  The laws and regulations 
governing dispute resolution/arbitration show differences among the states.  These 
variations are clearly the result of heterogeneous preferences among residents and 
governments and the different economic realities of the 50 states.    20
Table 1: Labor Laws in Selected States 
 
Labor Laws  Minimum Wage  Overtime 
UI – Benefit 
Formula 
California  6.75  Time and half  HQ – 1/23-1/33 
Oregon  7.05  Time and half  AW – 1.25% 
Idaho  5.15  None  HQ – 1/26 
Pennsylvania  5.15  Time and half  HQ – 1/23-1/25 
Ohio  4.25  Time and half  AWW– 50%+DA 
Kansas  2.65 
Time and half after 
46 hours per week 
HQ - 4.25% 
 
Sources:  http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm, 
http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/sigprojan2003.asp, 
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2003/monetary_entit.pdf 
HQ – High Quarter Formula: weekly benefit is fraction of quarterly income in the highest income quarter in the base period 
AW – Annual Wage Method:  weekly benefit is percentage of annual wages in the base period 
AWW – Average Weekly Wage: weekly benefit is percentage of average weekly wage in the base period 
 
 

















California  8.84 Flat  rate  800 6.00  2.50 
Oregon  6.6 Flat  rate  10  No  No 
Idaho  7.6 Flat  rate  20 5.00  3.00 





Pennsylvania  9.99 Flat  rate  No  6.00  1.00 
Ohio  8.5 
3,000 -50,000 
(2) 
No. 5.00  2.00 
 
Sources: http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sl_sales.html,   
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corp_inc.html 
 
In Canada, there are obvious differences between the provinces, as Tables 3 and 4 
show for some labor regulations and business taxes. Canada’s case is complicated by the 
fact that some states like British Colombia have an English legal tradition while Quebec’s 
legal tradition is linked with that of France. India is a large developing country where 
states have quite different institutional structures.  While the Industrial Disputes    21
Table 3: Labor Regulation in Selected Provinces of Canada 
   Quebec Ontario  British  Columbia 
min. wage  $7.45/hour  $7.15 per hour  $8/hour (general) 
lay-off notice  written notice of lay-off must be 
given one (1) week in advance if 
you have between three (3) 
months and one (1) year of 
service; two (2) weeks in advance 
if you have one (1) to five (5) 
years of service; four (4) weeks in 
advance if you have five (5) to ten 
(10) years of service; eight (8) 
weeks in advance if you have ten 
(10) or more years of service. 
No employer shall terminate the 
employment of an employee 
who has been continuously 
employed for three months or 
more unless the employer, (a) 
has given to the employee 
written notice of termination in 
accordance with section 57 or 
58 and the notice has expired; 
or (b) has complied with section 
61. 2000, c. 41, s. 54. 
The B.C. Employment 
Standards Act requires that 
employees who are 
terminated receive 
compensation based on length 
of service. No compensation is 
required if an employee is 
given advance written notice 
of termination equal to the 
number of weeks for which 
the employee is eligible. 
Please note that this notice 
MUST be in writing. An 
employee can also be given a 
combination of written notice 
and compensation equal to 
the number of weeks’ pay for 
which the employee is eligible.
 






British Columbia  http://www.labour.gov.bc.ca/esb/esaguide/ 
 
Table 4: Business Regulation 
 Quebec  Ontario  British  Columbia 
corporate 
income tax 
16.25% (as of Dec. 2002)  14% (as of end of 2003)  13.5% (general)  
corporate 
capital tax 
.69% ~ 1.29% depending 
on type of business 
0.30%  0% ~3% (financial corporation pays 
higher rate) depending on the type of 
business, only for those with net paid 
up capital (or are part of an 
associated group that have net paid 
up capital) in excess of $1,500,000 
tax credit  67 entries relating to tax 
credit, for example, R&D or 
innovation tax credit is 35% 
(federal level, another 20-
35%) 
10 types of special tax credit, 
including Ontario Innovation Tax 
Credit (OITC) which is 10%, for a 
max. qualifying $ 2 m; there are 4 
tax incentives (offers tax 
deduction) related to education 
and welfare of employees, such as 
Workplace Child Care Tax 
Incentive (WCCTI) 
9 programs for tax credits, including 
tax credit for film and TV, scientific 
R&D,  manufacturing and processing, 
book publishing, etc. "family farm 
corporations" and four other forms of 







British Columbia  http://www.rev.gov.bc.ca/itb/itacit/itacit.htm 
  http://www.rev.gov.bc.ca/itb/cct/cct.htm 
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Act of 1947, is a piece of federal legislation governing industrial policies, there have been 
several amendments at the state level since its adoption.  All states started at the same 
point but diverged over time (Besley and Burgess, 2004) such that today employer-
employee relations are governed by quite different rules.  Minimum wage legislation in 
Table 5 shows one aspect of disparity between the states. 
Table 5:  Minimum Wage Schedules in Selected Indian States 
 
Range of Minimum 





No. of Scheduled 
Employments for 
which Minimum 
Wages have been 
fixed/revised 
Min *** Max  
Andhra Pradesh  62  25.96  78.77 
Goa 18  21  140.26 
Kerala 35  30  184.26 
Madhya Pradesh  36  51.8  74.34 
Maharashtra 63  8.46  119.35 
Orissa 83  40  40.4 
Uttar Pradesh  65  58  83.42 
West Bengal  45  48.22  96.17 
 Wage in India 
The information is based on the notifications received in Labour Bureau till 12.06.2001  from different  
States/Union Territories and excludes wages fixed on piece rate basis. India has minimum wages that vary 
by industry. 
Source: http://labourbureau.nic.in/wagetab.htm  
 
While all states in India collect property taxes, states are now putting forth new 
initiatives in an effort to improve the transparency and effectiveness of their tax 
collection methods; yet these initiatives are independent of each other.  The traditional 
method of levying property taxes was based on the annual rental value of the property.  In 
practice this value was not estimated through the “market” but relied a great deal on   23
administrative/discretionary measures. A few municipalities and states have moved away 
from this system to establish a more transparent method based on tangible items such as 
location, land use, area among other things.  Andra Pradesh uses sample surveys of 
prevailing market rents for different categories of properties (Mathur, 2001). 
 The point is that much variation can be maintained to take account of differences 
in values and economic needs while trading to enhance welfare.  By extrapolation, the 
presumption is that as other countries integrate (foster flows of goods and services across 
borders), they too will be able to maintain their institutional diversity.  
At this stage one might ask what the evidence says about the effect of institutional 
differences on cross-border flows of goods and services?  The available empirical 
evidence  on how certain types of institutions affect trade flows and competitiveness is 
mixed.  It is intuitively obvious that domestic institutions as well as international ones  
will affect the pattern of trade and are affected by it but it is not obvious whether in 
affecting a particular flow a single institutional feature would always have more of an 
effect than others.  To be more precise, it is not obvious that labor standards alone would 
be a determining factors for competitiveness of a country’s exports or that corporate tax 
rates would always be the determining factor when choosing incorporation in one country 
versus another.  
Rodrik (1997) does find that countries with less expensive labor standards have a 
comparative advantage in labor intensive products.  Freeman (2003) on the other hand, 
argues that looking at labor standards alone as directing trade flows is misleading.  While 
labor standards may increase labor costs, lower wages, or depreciation may be used to 
counter the higher costs.  Others have found that reducing direct regulations on cross   24
border flows (that is reducing tariffs) may not boost exports if macroeconomic policy 
causes real exchange rate appreciation.  Most studies do not find environmental 
regulations to have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness (Jaffee et al, 1995).  On 
the other hand another paper (Hines, 1995), documents how domestic legislation towards 
corrupt trade practices in other countries put US firms at disadvantage.  The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 made it illegal for US businesses to pay bribes to foreign 
officials.  The design of regulations in export processing zones has affected the flow of 
trade but most studies attribute this to the overall set of regulations rather than to a 
specific regulation (Madani, 1999). The literature on capital flows across borders 
indicates that while reducing restrictions to capital flows may positively influence cross 
border flows of capital, other features are very important as well: for example growth 
prospects, macroeconomic and fiscal policies, exchange rate regulations, and implicit or 
explicit government guarantees on debt  among other policy and institutional factors. 
Another point to keep in mind is that trade flows are not affected only by profit or 
cost considerations and focusing on these aspects may fail to give the whole story.  
Demand for goods by consumers can be affected by “moral” values or put another way 
“tastes” (or norms).  For example, consumers may refuse to purchase tuna, if the method 
of fishing used harms dolphins.  Dyck and Zingales (2002) report how restaurant chains 
in the United States took tuna off the menu until it was “dolphin safe.” 
The fact that the empirical results do not systematically point to differences in a 
single institutional feature as being critical in explaining flows across borders should not 
be surprising for two fundamental reasons: (a) that there is no one- to -one correlation 
between institutional structure and function (World Bank 2001) and (b) comparing any   25
single institution across countries does not necessarily provide a clear indicator of how 
the whole system functions or how profitable a trade is.  The total returns from engaging 
in a particular activity depends on a host of factors; it makes more sense to think of the 
whole set of institutions which have relevance for a particular transaction as being 
important in determining cross border flows.  The eventual impact of these institutions on 
the economy and on the incentives provided to different actors depends very much on the 
whole policy and institutional framework and how well the institutions support the 
transaction in question.  If one accepts this – then it is easier to understand how 
institutional diversity- that is differences in particular institutions can be maintained.  
To be more precise, if the transaction is repayment of a loan by a debtor through 
the intervention of the formal legal system a number of institutions become relevant 
(Islam 2003): the substantive law outlining the conditions under which the loan is said to 
be in default, the procedural law determining what steps need to be taken by the debtor 
and the creditor to resolve the matter in court, the rules governing the market for lawyers 
(and thus their incentives to bring the matter to a speedy conclusion), the regulations 
governing the actions of judges and their clerks and so on.  When an investor chooses to 
invest in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Malawi for the production and export of garments 
he/she is concerned labor market regulations, the condition of infrastructure (which in 
turn is determined by the policies and institutions in that sector), education and literacy 
rates, trade regulations (including preferential trading arrangements and the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing),  and so on.  Which factor (and which institution)  becomes the 
“binding constraint” varies from time to time and from country to country.    26
Depending on each state/region’s initial conditions and assets, policy responses to 
globalization will also be very different.  Let us take the forces of competition.  As 
Soesastro (1998) states there was strong competition among the countries in Asia arising 
from a desire to do better in the global economy.  One way this has manifested itself is a 
desire to improve educational institutions in Vietnam, since global integration is being 
expected to raise the returns to skilled labor (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
2002) and thus returns to education.  Provinces within Canada have been characterized as 
having an “interesting diversity of labor market institutions” (Bowles 1998); Canadian 
provinces have also chosen responses customized to their particular context.  British 
Columbia saw expanded post-secondary education, greater emphasis on vocational skills 
and investment in infrastructure as the appropriate response to competition from global 
markets.  In Ontario, they focused on reducing business regulations and the levels of 
support to the unemployed and to social safety nets.  This model, according to Bowles 
“follows a free market route to competing in the global economy.” 
International Regulations 
What about the impact of globalization on international institutions (regulations/ 
standards) designed at the international level by sovereign nations or private actors? 
These institutions may be designed with the intention of regulating negative spillovers 
between countries (as in the case of international financial standards) as well as to 
promote or restrict trade by lowering/raising transaction costs associated with trading 
goods and services. In order to evaluate the impact of such institutions some important 
questions to ask are: (a) What are the potential efficiency gains from setting international 
standards, i.e., lower transactions costs, and thus larger markets? or (b) Who will be left   27
out of markets through any entry/exit barriers being proposed?  For example, rich 
countries could collude on process/product standards to keep out new or smaller players 
in markets, or could restrict the flow of  ideas/technology developed across the border.  
What is therefore the distribution and magnitude of gains/losses across countries and 
within regions? (c) Are static and dynamic gains/losses substantially different in sign and 
magnitude?  What discount rate should be applied to losses and gains? (d) In cases where 
some countries gain unambiguously and others lose, what compensation would there be 
for the losers? And (e) How will individual countries deal with within country 
distributional impacts? 
As an example, consider the case of food standards.  Developed countries may 
insist on certain processing standards with the declared intention of improving the safety 
of the products they consume based on economic and political considerations in their 
home country.  Suppose also that these standards are already in effect in the developed 
countries and these become “international” standards.  Among developing countries, one 
would expect some countries being able to adopt these new standards without incurring 
too high costs, namely those who are already producing close to this standard.  In all 
cases, there would be costs incurred to gain access to the (previously free) market.   
Countries which were exporters of this food product could lose their market to more 
sophisticated/ richer producers; these new standards would effectively work as entry 
barriers for this category of exporters.  Note that real resources would be required to meet 
standards and to monitor compliance.  If the adoption of standards makes developing 
country products more attractive to consumers and demand increases enough for goods 
imported from developing countries at the higher standard, then exporters facing the new   28
standards may gain depending on how much demand shifts, and how prices change, if at 
all.  Exporters whose standards were formalized into “international” standards gain to the 
extent the entry is restricted and competition reduced.  But within developing countries 
new or smaller farmers may be unable to meet these costs and would be barred from 
access to these markets.  Other examples of international standards are product standards 
for manufactured goods, or environmental standards.  In all of these cases, as in the 
national context, implementing regulations/standards affects distribution as well as 
efficiency.   
The recent debates over cheese made from raw (non-pasteurized milk) serve to 
illuminate how distributional concerns may come to dominate the dialogue on 
international standards.  Italy, France, and Switzerland are the major producers of raw 
cheese in the EU. The Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS) Agreement of the WTO 
indicates that Codex (Russell, 1999) is the intergovernmental body for harmonizing food 
safety standards. Essentially Codex standards become international law.  The WTO relies 
on them because Codex in turn relies on scientific analysis for its guidelines and 
standards.  According to the SPS guidelines if a nation adopts standards higher than those 
set by international bodies such as Codex, they must justify them on scientific grounds. 
These types of justifications are expensive to do in practice.  
Since the US is not an exporter of raw milk products, US constituents support 
standards requiring that dairy products be made from pasteurized milk.  If Codex adopts 
guidelines requiring pasteurization of milk, US dairy producers could gain market share. 
US producers presumably would prefer to face less competition for their cheeses but may 
also have an additional concern.  They may fear that illness arising from consumption of   29
any milk products may affect the dairy industry’s reputation more broadly and that raw 
milk products significantly increase this risk.  French farmers fear that if standards are 
harmonized, they will lose since the market for certain cheeses will shrink.  The scientific 
evidence, in terms of whether raw milk products have caused illnesses in recent times, 
does not show conclusively that raw milk products have endangered health.  For 
example, milk may be contaminated after pasteurization.  Thus, there is no clear cut 
justification on  purely “scientific” grounds for banning raw milk products based on 
health concerns.  Since there do not seem to be compelling efficiency or public health 
related reasons for requiring pasteurization, it seems that the real issue is purely a 
distributional one between producers of these cheeses and their competitors.  Even more 
interesting, it seems that for trade within the EU, the issue has been resolved, but not  by 
using mandated standards such as pasteurization.  Instead member countries that produce 
cheese from raw milk are allowed to assure its safety in another way, namely, by 
adopting additional (testing) measures to assume the safety of their products.  Put in other 
words, the EU states allow institutional/regulatory diversity while achieving the same 
objective of consumer safety (Vermont Cheese Council, 2000).  
 Just as countries with greater political as well as economic strength will dominate 
the design of institutions, so will private entities with lobbying power.  Large private 
multinationals or consumers through the exercise of their purchasing power in markets 
can affect international rules. The larger the consumer market or the greater the potential 
for firms to exercise their market power, the greater the influence there is likely to be on 
global markets. Thus consumers in the United States carry great weight with British/EU   30
producers and if diversification to serve many different tastes is costly, these producers 
will be more likely to standardize according to US tastes than to Ghanaian tastes.  
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement was signed by WTO 
members rich and poor.  Intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation aims to give market 
power (monopoly power) to firms in order to protect the profits resulting from the 
application of an  innovation.  The argument holds that since innovations can be copied, 
the innovator is unlikely to capture the benefits from the innovation though the 
innovating firm will have incurred costs to innovate.  Thus  in the absence of IPR 
protection, the incentives to innovate would be low and there would be an under-
provision of innovation.  A strong IPR regime however, raises the costs of acquiring new 
technology and products, shifting the global terms of trade in favor of technology 
producers (generally the rich countries) and against the technology consumers (generally 
the poor countries).  Extended to the international trade arena, one might argue that 
stronger IPR protection worldwide would promote more innovation worldwide or a faster 
rate of technological change.  Second, trade flows would be affected by the strength of  
IPR 
8 and the changed pattern of trade may lead to lower global welfare.  Though I will 
not review the literature here, it seems that neither of these statements can be shown to be 
true in practice.  Yet  an agreement protecting intellectual property was adopted and 
signed by all WTO signatory countries:  some developing countries gave up their rights 
to obtain access to access to cheap medicines.  Note that most developed countries did 
not adopt strong IPR protection regimes at early stages of development. 
Reducing asymmetries in information about the actual costs and benefits of 
particular institutional designs can go a long way towards affecting institutional 
                                                 
8 See Maskus (2000) and Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Maskus (2002).   31
outcomes.  An example is provided by the campaign of the media and of NGOs aimed at 
changing the TRIPs agreement so that poor people suffering from AIDs could obtain 
cheap medicine.  Private pharmaceutical companies feared that allowing other countries  
to make the relevant drugs cheaply would lead to increased supply and an overall decline 
in their profits.  As the severe health crisis has continued, media and NGO activism have 
highlighted the critical public health perspectives and in particular, the number of poor 
people dying while multinationals reaped substantial profits.  As a result of this activism 
and consequent pressure on pharmaceutical groups and governments, eventually, there 
has been a partial modification of the agreement to allow poor countries to produce 
medicines locally in cases of epidemics or national emergencies.  
Another area of where consumer activism is rife is that of child labor.  There are 
various consumer groups and NGOs that write about the injustice associated with using 
child labor to produce traded goods and about the need to establish regulations banning it. 
Some consumers in developed countries have viewed it as their “moral” responsibility to 
refrain from purchasing these goods.  Surprisingly, the media has downplayed facts that 
would shed some light on the “other side” of the issue.  The “other side”  being a more 
comprehensive understanding of the poverty/child labor nexus and appropriate policy 
responses.  Such a discussion would explain that children who currently work in factories 
producing exported goods, if pushed out of these sectors due to a consumer boycott 
would simply be pushed to work in the non-traded goods sector, or would find 
themselves not only poorer, but on the street without regular work.  It would explain that, 
it is generally poverty that sends children to work; children work because their family   32
needs income for basic survival,
9 that in an ideal world, all school-age children would be 
in schools.  But until these schools are built and a financially viable alternative provided 
to poor families without income, it is probably better in the short run to have girls in 
factories, from a “moral” as well as an economic point of view, rather than on the streets. 
The true benefit to a given set of people, at a given point in time, from a given policy/ 
institutional design really depends on the feasible set of alternatives- since both the 
definition and the implementation of the ideal set is a difficult, if not impossible, thing. 
At this point, it is useful to consider an analogy – that between the role of 
institutions and that of technology in economic development.  Improved technology 
offers either a better (e.g. cheaper) way of producing the same thing or defines a new set 
of production possibilities.  Better institutions facilitate the “production” of goods and 
services or even support the production of new goods and services.  Institutions, like 
technology are an intermediate input to production and trade.  Similar to the case of 
technological innovation, new institutions can be thought of as being  “produced” by real 
endowments such as capital, labor, and other things such as the state of technology itself 
and may be affected by the initial distribution of wealth.  As is true for technological 
changes, relative price movements change cost/benefit calculations for consumers and 
producers for a given set of institutions and create pressures for change.  As for 
technology, there is an inherent conflict between the forces leading to innovation 
/customization  and those favoring standardization.  First, an innovation (and similarly, 
customization) that works well would tend to be standardized but, in a dynamic setting, 
raise the costs for new innovations to be accepted.  Second, there are certainly 
technological developments that countries can adopt from others (standardization) with a 
                                                 
9 See Basu and Tzannatos (2003) for a discussion of these issues.   33
view to increasing output.  Third, competition may increase pressures for new way of 
doing things rather than for standardization.  Fourth, not all technologies are the “right” 
ones for all countries all the time—for example the use of computer technology may be a 
secondary priority where literacy is low. 
Just as the appropriate technology may differ depending on initial conditions, so 
may institutions (for example, where community mechanisms of dispute resolution are 
strong and effective they may be used in preference to formal state-sponsored courts). 
Whether the standardized or customized solution will maximize output for a given 
country depends on the costs and benefits of each at a given point in time, and the overall 
objectives of each nation.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, I would like to highlight four points.  First, even while economic 
integration has increased, countries have maintained diversity in their institutional 
structures.  In other words, the two can co-exist.  This is easy to understand once one 
accepts that (a) there is not a one-to-one mapping from the design/structure of institutions 
to their functions and also that (b) the relevant institutional unit may not be one 
regulation or one law but the set of rules (including the norms) governing each 
transaction and therefore trade flows.  It is usually the whole mix of incentives provided 
by (policies and) institutions rather than one institutional change that determines how 
trade flows proceed, though at some moments one or more may take overwhelming 
precedence in guiding transactions and trade (e.g. perhaps a large expected depreciation 
will take precedence in determining the direction of short term capital flows).  The key 
issue for countries is how they can make each economic transaction more effective.   34
Second, in theory the choice between innovation/ customization and 
standardization in institutional design depends on a multitude of factors - the relative 
merits of each depending on conditions within a given country at a given point in time. 
Neither differentiation nor standardization is always “good”.  Innovations can raise 
productivity – institutional diversity is often necessary to take account of different 
endowments and different initial conditions in a country.  Under some conditions 
standardization of institutions will confer economic greater benefits in productivity and 
distributional impacts.  Under others, it may not.  Each country needs to weigh these 
costs and benefits.   
Third, politics or the consideration of non-economic benefits may play a large 
role in determining institutional changes, as evidenced by the harmonization drive within 
the EU.  The countries of the EU have decided that having a single  set of institutions 
(which might be thought of as the extreme version of standardization) determining 
monetary policy a la Mundell’s optimum currency areas will ensure net positive benefits 
to a set of countries that are increasingly choosing to speak with one voice.  This is not to 
say that a similar union including say India, China, Thailand or any other set of 
developing or developed countries would find similar benefits in such an arrangement 
either in economic or political terms.  
Fourth, some contend that standardization of trade-related institutions across 
countries should be a priority since facilitating trade will bring benefits to all countries.  
There are at least two reasons why this is not as straightforward as it sounds.  First, in 
practice countries need to decide on the standard, a decision that in itself will lead to 
redistribution of gains/losses across countries and these redistributions should be   35
acknowledged up-front and possible compensation designed.  (A corollary is that 
institutional diversity can reduce the need for compensation).  Second, there are 
innumerable institutions that affect trade between countries but which may serve other 
purposes and this distinction is not always useful. 
While most countries would like to be able to trade more effectively and most 
governments would agree that better performance in export markets is good for growth, 
there is no accepted ranking of which precise outcome constitutes higher global welfare 
when the redistributive effects vary between outcomes.  Institutional change, whether led 
by private entities or by sovereign ones, can benefit from the actions of informed 
coalitions acting as checks and balances.  International institutions can foster a more 
equitable distribution of benefits by reflecting the views and requirements of all types of 
countries rather than those of a powerful elite.  And this will probably mean leaving 
sufficient flexibility at country levels so that countries can vary in how they adhere to 
these rules and standards while achieving more or less common objectives.  And it will 
mean understanding and accepting that all countries do not have to have the same 
objectives at all times in order to trade more.  Finally, in between domestic and 
internationally determined institutions, there is another category not specifically 
discussed here – regionally or bilaterally determined ones.  The principles discussed here 
apply there as well.  
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